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CoNTRACTS--lMPRACTICABILITY OF PERFORMANCE .As AN EXCUSE FOR BREACH OF CoNTRAcT*-ln a recent federal case, plaintiff

construction company contracted to enlarge a dam for defendants,

which would involve, according to the original estimates, the excavation of

*

30,000

cubic yards of earth. During the performance of the

This is the second in a series of related comments in the law of Contracts and
Restitution, to be published from time to time throughout volume 46 of the REVIEW.
1.o1. 132 Tenn. 323, 178 S.W. 432 (1915).
1.o2 141 Tenn. 556, 213 S.W. t!-14 (1919).
1.os BRANNAN's NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw, 6th ed., 399 (1938).
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contract, defendants ordered further excavation in order to reach a
firm foundation so that ultimately a total of 84,000 cubic yards were
removed. It was defendant's claim that the plaintiff was obliged to
perform this additional work to fulfill its contract. Plaintiff sued in
quantum meruit for the value of labor and materials for the entire
project; defendants stood upon the contract, contending that mere
unanticipated difficulty or expense did not excuse the plaintiff's late
performance of the contract or furnish a basis for additional compensation. Holding that uncontemplated circumstances (presumably unusual soil and rock conditions underlying the surface) had made radical
changes in the character, amount, and expense of. the work to be performed, the court found that the contract should be deemed abrogated
and allowed full recovery on a quantum meruit basis.1 This decision is
noteworthy because not only does it accept the doctrine of impracticability of performance as an excuse for non-performance of contractual
duties, but it carries the doctrine to the extreme of charging the
promisee with the additional expense incurred in rendering "impracticable" performance.
When and to what extent will impracticability of performance serve
as an excuse for breach of contract by the promisor? 2 At the outset
it should be observed that the early English case of Paradine v. Jane 8
laid down the so-called "rule of absolute promises," taking the position
that impossibility of performance does not excuse the promisor, for
he might have guarded against such a contingency in his contract. To
this general rule several exceptions have long been recognized: (I)
that performance of a contract of personal services is excused by the
death or serious illness of the promisor; 4 ( 2) that one who cannot
fulfill a promise because a supervening law makes such performance
impossible is excused; 5 and (3) that the fortuitous destruction or non1
Transbay Construction Company v. City and County of San Francisco, (D.C.
Cal. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 433; reversed, the court pointing out that the theory that
the contract was abrogated was erroneous in that the plaintiff had proceeded with the
contract without electing to consider it rescinded because of the breach of defendants
in unjustifiable delays in the ordering of additional excavation, and that under such
circumstances recovery in quantum meruit would extend only to the work performed
in excess of that called for by the contract. (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 468.
2
The scope of this comment is limited to the analysis of those situations in which
the promisor may escape liability for failure to complete his performance. The related
problem concerning the promisor's claim for compensation for performance actually
executed will be discussed in a companion comment scheduled to appear in a later
issue of the REVIEW.
8
Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1646).
4
Cutler v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 274 Mass. 341, 174 N.E. 507 (1931);
Williams v. Butler, 59 Ind. App. 47, 105 N.E. 387 (1914); see CoNTRACTS RESTATE•
MENT, § 459 (1932).
15 Baily v. DeCrespigny, L.R. 4 Q.B. 180 (1869); Gammon v. Blaisdell, 45 Kan.
221, 25 P. 580 (1891); CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT, § 458 (1932).

226

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 46

existence of an essential subject matter excuses ·performance.6 Often
linked with impossibility as an excuse is the doctrine of "frustration
of the venture," epitomized in the "coronation cases." 7 There it was
held that the postponement of the coronation of King Edward VII
put an end to contracts for letting and hiring of seats along the procession route, not because performance had been rendered impossible,
but because the supervening circumstance had destroyed or "frustrated" the sole value of the contracts to the promisor-licensees. 8 In
these cases the courts seem to be striving to reach an equitable and just
result in a situation not provided for in the contract of the parties, but
often they have disguised the nature of their intervention by various
rationalizations. Sometimes it is said that (a) there was an implied
condition in the contract that impossibility would excuse performance,9
or (b) destruction or non-existence of the subject matter works a "djscharge by operation of law," w or ( c) there was a, failure of considera_tion,11 or (d) the promisee assumed the risk of performance.12
The doctrine accepted in the principal case, that extreme and unforeseen difficulties and expense which render performance impracticable will discharge the promisor, is a fairly recent exception to or extension of the exception to the "rule of absolute promises." It has not
yet gained a firm foothold in our law. Not only is the doctrine a departure from the generally accepted principle that mere hardship and
. difficulty will not relieve one from his contractual duties, but it involves a precarious distinction between degrees of hardship in order to
distinguish impracticability from difficulty on the one hand and impossibility on the other..
6
Matousek v. Galligan, rn4 Neb. 731, 178 N.W. 510 (i920); Potts Drug Co.
v. Benedict, 156 Cal. 322, rn4 P. 432 (1909); CoNTRACTs RESTATEMENT, §§ 281,
460 (1932).
'
7 For a discussion of the frustration doctrine, see Buckland, "Casus and Frustration in Roman and Common Law," 46 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1933).
For an application of the doctrine to war-time contracts, see McNair, "Frustration of Contract by War," 56 L. Q. REv. 173 (1940).
8
Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740; see 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, § 1954
(1938).
9
Elliot v. Crutchley, [1906] A.C. (H.L.) 7; Warren v. Wagner, 75 Ala. 188
(1883); Runyon v. Culver, 168 Ky. 45, 181 S.W. 640 (1916).
The theory of implied condition has been criticized as a fiction invented by courts
to enable them to make a new contract for the parties.. Page, "Development of the
Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance," 18 MicH. L. REv. 589 (1920).
10
"In other words, something must be the subject-matter of every contract. If
that something has disappeared, the contract disappears with that on which it was
founded." Goddard, J. in Tatem v. Gamboa, [1938] 3 All Eng. Rep. (K.B.) 135
at 143.
11
Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage Co., 170 App. Div. 484, 156 N.Y.S.
179 (1915); Tulsa Opera House Co. v. Mitchell, 165 Okla. 61, 24 P. (2d) 997
(1933).
12
6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1937 (1938).
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It is well settled, as a general rule, that if performance is rendered
merely more burdensome, difficult, or expensive than contemplated by
the promisor, he is not relieved. 18 The basis for the rule, of course, is
that the purpose of a contract is to transfer risk of performance and
this purpose would be completely defeated if the law should excuse
one who had assumed a greater obligation than he could profitably
discharge. Instances of the application of the rule are legion.14 A striking example is found in building contracts where the building has been
destroyed or damaged while in the process of erection. Whether the
damage or destruction is caused by weather conditions,15 defective construction plans,16 fire,1 1 or defective soil,18 the contractor is not relieved
and must build anew. Legal insufficiency of the excuse often is found
in the fact that the. promisor failed to make his promise conditional
upon the contingency which arose,19 and sometimes in his encountering
merely "subjective," rather than "objective," impossibility of performance. 20
18

6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1963 (1938); CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 467
{1932).
14
See cases collected in L.R.A. 1916F IO.
Recent decisions applying the rule include Miller v. Johns, 291 Ky. 126, 163
S.W. (2d) 9 (1942) (unforeseen rocks made excavations more difficult and expensive
than anticipated); Bonwit Teller Inc. v. United Parcel Service of New York, Inc.,
(S. Ct., Spec. Term, N.Y. Co. 1942) 36 N.Y.S. (2d) 304 (picketing about plaintiff's
store made it dangerous and difficult for defendant to perform contract to pick up and
,deliver packages to plaintiff's customers); O'Dell v. Criss & Shaver, Inc., 123 W. Va.
290, 14 S.E. (2d) 767 (1941) (union regulations prevented defendant from performing .haulage contracts); Ryan v. Brown Motors, 132 N.J.L. 154, 39 A. (2d) 70
(1944) (federal government regulations restricting sale of automobiles held no defense
to breach of employment contract of plaintiff, secretary for an auto sales corporation).
15
Brent v. Head, Westervelt & Co., 138 Iowa, 146, II5 N.W. uo6 (1908)
(settling of foundations due to freezing weather); Cannon v. Hunt, II3 Ga. 501, 38
S.E. 983 (1901) '(unusual heavy rains delayed ~ompletion of building contract); J.
D. Harms, Inc. v. Meade, 186 Wash. 287, 57 P. (2d) 1052 (1936) (road building:
delayed by wet weather and light snows).
16
N.J. Magnan Co. v. Fuller, 222 Mass. 530, I I I N.E. 399 ~1916) (plans
so impracticable that grandstand, if erected, would be unsafe); Board of Education v.
Empire State Surety Co., 83 N.J.L. 293, 85 A. 223 (1912) (specifications so unsubstantial that building would fall during work or soon thereafter); see 21 MINN.
L. REV. 70 (1936).
17
Albus v. Ford, (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 296 S.W. 981; Sands and Oliver v.
Quigg, I I I Va. 476, 69 S.E. 440 (1910).
18
Carlson v. Sheehan, 157 Cal. 692, 109 P. 29 (1910); Ford v. Shepard Co.,
36 R. I. 497, 90 A. 805 (1914).
19 Usually courts express this idea by a paraphrase of the words found in Paradine
v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1646), such as the following: But where the
party by his contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it
good, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have
provided against it by his contract.
•
20
'
A distinction is drawn between "objective" impossibility ("it cannot be done"),
which will excuse non-performance, and "subjective" impossibility ("I cannot do it''),

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Lying somewhere between the poles of difficulty and impossibility
is a middleground of impracticability. The phrase must be defined
if it is to serve as a criterion in determining excuse for non-performance.
What does "impracticability" rµean? The Restatement of Contracts
describes, rather than defines, the term as follows:
"In the Restatement of this Subject impossibility means not
only strict impossibility but impracticability because of extreme
and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss involved.
· "Comment: A statement that it is only when facts make performance impossible that they have the operation stated in this
chapter must be interpreted to be correct. 'Impossible' must be
given a practical rather than a scientifically exact meaning." 21
Professor Williston rejects the distinction between impossibility
and difficulty in these words:
"The true distinction is not between difficulty and impossibility. A man may contract to do what is impossible as well as what
is difficult, and be liable for failure to perform. The important
question is whether an unanticipated circumstance has made performance of the promise vitally different from what should reasonably have been within tlie contemplation of both parties when
they entered into the contract. If so, the risk should not fairly
be thrown upon the promisor." 22
Implicit in these statements is the idea that impracticability, like
impossibility, will never excuse if the promisor has assumed the risk
of performance. If he should have foreseen the supervening "unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss," he must perform according to his contract or respond in damages. 28 Similarly, difficulties and
which generally is said to be no excuse. For an application of this distinction, see
Freeto v. State Highway Commission, 161 Kan. 7, 166 P. (2d) 728 (1946), and
generally, 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs, § 19'32 (1938).
21
CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT,§ 454 (1932).
22 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, § 1931, p. 5411 (1938). "The difficulty with
this statement [by Professor Williston] is that it is not unequivocal (for what exactly
does 'vitally different' mean?), and that there is found in English law, side by side
and consistently with the rule that supervening difficulty does not discharge, the
principle that a change of circumstances may, though the performance still remains
apparently within the capability of the promisor, make the only performance available
in reality something quite different from what was contemplated by the contract.
Williston would probably call such circumstances 'vitally different' within the meaning
of his rule. But in fact the vital difference still seems to be that between impossibility
and difficulty." Wade, "The Principle of Impossibility in Contract," 56 L.Q. 519
at 553 (1940) •.
28 Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. (2d) 48, 153 P. (2d) 47 (1944), where federal
restrictions on the sale of new cars making payment of rental of an auto sales room
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hardship which render performance extre19-ely expensive do not justify
an additional charge for extra work if it can fairly be found that the
promisor assumed the risk. 24
How far has the idea of impracticability been equated with that
of impossibility to serve as an excuse for breach of contract? Although
dicta may be found in a few cases 25 which seem to encourage the doctrine, it has generally been rejected in England. 26 The doctrine has
gained a tenuous foothold in some American courts. Cases may be
found in California,21 Iowa, 28 Illinois,29 West Virginia,8° Oklahoma,81
and the federal courts 82 in which the definitive concept of impracticabiliextremely difficult, held to be no excuse, for "the risk of war and resulting effect on
leases and market for cars should have been anticipated"; Freeto v. State Highway
Commission, 161 Kan. 7, 166 P. (2d) 728 (1946), in which the court held that
government requisitioning of defendant's road construction equipment was no ground
for cancellation of contract to build a road, for war should have been foreseen.
24
Cannon v. Wildman, 28 Conn. 472 (1859); cf. the principal case.
25
See F. A. Tamplin Steamship Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co.,
(1916] 2 A.C. 397 at 405, 406; and Moss v. Smith, (1850] 9 C.B. 94 at 103,
where this dictum is found: "In matters of business a thing is said to be impossible
when it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done
at an excessive or unreasonable cost."
26
Wade, "Impossibility in Contract,''" 56 L. Q. REv. 519 (1940), and cases
cited by McNair's "War-time Impossibility of Performance of Contract,'' 35 L. Q.
REv. 84 at 97 (1919).
27
Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916), discussed infra; Eucalyptus Growers Assn. v. -Orange County N. & L. Co., 174 Cal.
330, 163 P. 45 (1917), where defendant was excused from breach of contract to plant
eucalyptus trees because the soil contained so much alkali that trees would not grow
unless alkali was eliminated by flooding; Christin v. Superior Ct., 9 Cal. (2d) 526,
71 P. (2d) 205 (1937) (dictum).
28
Mahaska County State Bank v. Brown, 159 Iowa 577, 141 N.W. 459 (1913)
(bankruptcy of mortgagor excused advancement of funds by the mortgagee).; Harrison
v. Harrison, 124 Iowa 525, 100 N.W. 344 (1904) (death of father before all debts
paid excused daughter from performance of contract to help manage farm); see generally, lowA .ANNOTATIONS TO THE CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 454 (1934).
29
Fisher v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 313 Ill. App. 66, 39 N.E. (2d)"
67 (1942) (ordinance prohibiting production of theatrical productions within two
hundred feet of any church held to discharge a contract to demolish an old building
and construct a theater, the court emphasizing the impracticability of performance
and quoting § 454 of CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, a portion of which is set out supra,
p. 228.
so Paxton Lumber Co. v. Panther Coal Co., 83 W.Va. 341, 98 S.E. 563 (1919),
where defendant was excused from supplying lumber because his timber holdings
proved insufficient to satisfy the contract needs: "there appears to be manifestly increasing tendency to afford him [ the promisor] relief upon equitable principles where
great hardship would ensue by forcing him to do what is practically impossible of
performance."
81
Cosden Oil and Gas Co. v. Moss, 131 Okla. 49, 267 P. 855 (1928), where
defendant was relieved from drilling oil and gas wells to maximum depth because
rock formations made drilling impracticable.
82
Vernon Lumber Corp. v. Harcen Const. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 60 F. Supp.
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ty has been utilized as an excuse for failure to perform contractual
obligations. In numerous other jurisdictions, similar results have been
reached througli the use of fictions. To avoid establishing a new "exception" to an already badly riddled rule, courts have often excused
performance which supervening circumstances have made impracticable
by bringing the facts within the o.peration of well-known rules of impossibility.
·
A. Impracticability Due to Destruction or Nonc--Existence of Subject Matter. The adaptation of the rule that destruction or non-existence of essential subject matter excuses performance 88 to cases where
performance has become unduly difficult or expensive is best exemplified in Mineral Park Company v. Howard. 34 There it was held that
the defendant, who had contracted to take from the plaintiff's land
all the gravel necessary to construct a bridge, was excused after partial
performance because the remaining grayel was below water level and
removable only at an expense of at least ten times the contemplated
cost. The court held that by "gravel" the parties meant "available
gravel," and the defendant was released when the "available grayel"
was exhausted. 85 The reasoning by which the court construes the contract to make it conditional upon the assumed existence of essential
subject matter has been prominently employed in cases involving the
leasing of mining privileges. If minerals are found only in quantities
and of a quality making it unprofitable to mine, the lessee has been
relieved of his obligation to pay royalties by the court's reading into
the contract a duty only to mine "clear and merchantable" minerals.36
Similarly, impracticable performance has been excused on the
ground of non-existence or destruction of the subject matter where
crops could not grow advantageously because o( sub-standard soil,37
555, where it was held that plaintiff must show "every reasonable attempt'' to find
alternative source of lumber to fill defendant's contract needs in order to be relieved
from breach of contract. See principal case.
'
38
See note 5, supra.
84
172 Cal. ,289, 156 P. 458 (1916), noted in 4 CAL. L. REV. 407 (1916).
85 This reasoning was buttressed by a frank acceptance of the concept that: "A
thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a ,thing is
impracticable when it can be done only at an· excessive and unreasonable cost." l 72
Cal. 289 at 293.
86 Muhlenberg v. Henning, II6 Pa. St. 138, 9 A. 144 (1887); Virginia Iron
Co. v. Graham, 124 Va. 692, 98 S.E. 659 (1919); Brick Co. v. Pond, 38 Ohio St. 65
(1882); Van Liew v. Norwood-White Coal Co., 190 Iowa 79, 179 N.W. 860 (1920).
87
Eucalyptus Growers Assn. v. Orange County N. & L. Co., 174 Cal., 330, 163
P. 45 (1917) (defendant excused from contract to plant and grow trees in soil containing so much alkali that trees would not grow unless alkali was eliminated by
flooding, on theory that alkali-free soil had been contemplated by parties and was
"non-existent'').
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or unusually bad weather conditions prevented profitable production.88
To the same effect are cases where building 89 or drilling operations 40
have been hindered unduly by geologic formations which were undetected at the time the parties entered into their contract.
B. Impracticability Due to Operation of Law. As we have seen,
when a statute or governmental authority forbids or prevents the performance of a contract which was legal when the promise was made,
the promisor is excused from liability.41 1?,-daptation of this principle
to release one from contractual duties whicff have become unreasonably
harsh or profitless by reason of supervening acts of the state, is seen
most clearly in war-time. Thus in Autry v. Republic Productions" 2
a prominent "cowboy" movie actor under contract to make photoplays
was inducted into the Army where he served for three years. Upon
his discharge from service he brought an action to have his contract
declared terminated, despite the plea of his employer that the temporary impossibility which had suspended performance of the agreement during the war had been rem~wed by the actor's release from the
Army. The court found that the plaintiff's war service had rendered
performance impossible according to the contract and, by strictly construing its employment provisions, concluded that post-war completion
of the agreement would constitute "performance wholly outside the
original agreement." 43
When a lessee was drafted into the armed forces he was found to
have been relieved from his obligation to pay rent although the lessor's
suit was brought after his release from service," and governmental
requisitioning which reduces the supply of available materials has relieved one who failed to meet contract requirements."G Supervening
city ordinances which do not prohibit exec~tion of construction con88

.

St. Joseph Hay Co. v. Brewster, (Mo. App. 1917) 195 S.W. 71 (1917) (in
contract to deliver 3000 bushels of wheat breach excused when excessive rainfall
caused a short wheat crop, on ground that contemplated crop was non-existant due to
"Act of God").
39
Kinzey Const. Co. v. State, 264 N.Y. 381, 97 N.E. 871 (1912).
4
Cosden Oil and Gas Co. v. Moss, 131 Okla. 49, 267 P. 855 ·(1928).
1
" See note 4, supra.
42
(Cal. App. 1946) 170 P. (2d) 977.
48
Id. at 984.
4
" State Realty Co. v: Greenfield, 110 Misc. 270, 181 N.Y.S. 511 (1920); Jefferson Estates, Inc. v. Wilson, (Manhattan Ct. 3d D., 1942) 35 N.Y.S. (2d) 582.
4
G Moore & Tierney, Inc. v. Roxford Knitting Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1918) 250 F.
278 (governmental requisitioning of some but not all of the goods of the promisorseller, who could have manufactured required quantity after completion of the government work); Vernon Lumber Corp. v. Harcen Const. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 60 F.
Supp. 555 (Navy requistioning of lumber required to fill contract would excuse if
promisor showed that it had tried "every reasonable alternative source."
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tracts but require substantially different or more expensive performance
have been held to relieve liability.46 These decisions seem contrary to
the general rule that governmental activities which make performance
of a contract less profitable or more difficult do not discharge liability
if performance remains physically possible.47 Impracticability, rather
than objective impossibility, would seem to be the true basis for these
decisions.
C. Impracticability Due to Death, Sickness, or Danger of Life.
To some extent courts have excused duties which have become extremely difficult or dangerous by bringing the facts of the case within the
rule that sickness or death of tlie promisor relieves his breach of contract. Thus in In re Ford's Estate,4 8 in consideration of a promise by
the vendor in a land contract to accept from the purchaser the first
four installments of interest in the form of four notes, decedent
promised in writing to indorse the notes and become responsible for
their payment to the vendor. The surety died before the first of the
notes was to be indorsed. Although the obligation could,have been performed by an agent of the surety during his life and thus ·could have
been performed by his personal representative after his death, the court
held that the decedent's estate was discharged from liability on the
ground that decedent's undertaking was purely personal and ended
with his death. To the same effect are cases where defendant is released from obligations under a lease by reason of holding over after
the expiration of a term on account of sickness of a member of his
family. 49 And where an epidemic makes performance of a contract dangerous to the health of workmen,5° or to the community,51 or where
46
In Cordes v. Miller, 39 Mich. 581 (1878), a covenant in a lease to rebuild
was excused by a building law forbidding use of wood of which the previous building
had been constructed, although covenant did not ~pecify a wooden construction.
In Fisher v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 313 Ill. App. 66, 39 N.E. (2d) 67
(1942), a city ordinance forbidding holding of theatrical production near any church
was held to relieve surety's liability on a contract to demolish old building and construct
a theater on spot; for alternative ground for decision, the court said that performance
was "impracticable."
47 Otto v. Orange Screen Co., (D.C. N.J. 1944) 57 F. Supp. 134; Freeto v.
State Highway Commission, 161 Kan. 7, 166 P. (2d) 728 (1946); Town of North
Hempstead v. Public Service Corp., 192 App. Div. 924, 182 N.Y.S. 954 (1919).
See annotation L.R.A. 1916F IO at 66.
48 255 Mich. 266, 238 N.W. 275 (1931), criticized in 30 MicH. L. REV. 809
(1932).
49
Herter v. Mullen, 159 N.Y. 28, 53 N.E. 700 (1899).
50 Lakeman v. Pollard, 43 Me. 463 (1857) (worker excused from quitting employment by reason of danger of cholera in vicinity of employer's lumber mills).
51 Hanford v. Connecticut Fair Assn., 92 Conn. 621 (1918) (epidemic of
infantile paralysis relieved breach of contract to hold a baby show).

_
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a state of war endangers the lives of passengers and the crew of an
unprotected ship at sea,52 breach of contract has been excused despite
the objective "possibility" of the promised performance. Similarly,
the impracticability of marriage at a particular time between a venereally infected· man and a healthy woman has been treated as if it were
an impossibility, 53 and employees have been excused from employment
contracts because of threatened physical injury to them by strikers and
pickets.54
D. Impracticability Due to "Mistake." A promise is excused genJ
erally if performance is rendered impossible because the parties mistakenly base their contract upon material facts which do not exist.5 5
The mistake doctrine has been utilized in cases where performance,
although possible, is commercially impracticable due to the "nonexistence" of subject matter requisite to make the contract profitable.56
A further example is found in Watson v. Brown,6 1 where the defendant
had agreed to form a corporation to produce wire fences with plaintiff's
machines and to pay plaintiff's services in wages and stock in the enterJ
prize. When subsequent tests showed that the machines could weave
only inferior fence materials which would fare poorly on the market,
the court relieved defendant of his obligation because there had been
a "mistake as to the nature or fundamental qualities of the subject
matter" which made the "subject matter contracted for essentially different in kind from the thing as it actually existed." Similar relief has
been given one who breached his contract to supply lumber on the
ground that there had been a "mistaken" assumption that the promisor's timber holdings would satisfy the needs of the promisee,58 and to
one who failed to drill through a geologic mass formation to reach
gas and oil when the parties had "assumed" that a test well could be
52
The Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U.S. 12, 37 S.Ct. 490 (1917), where
master of a ship was excused from delivering gold in England at the cost of capture
of ship, crew, and passengers during World War I.
58
Trammel v. Vaughan, 158 Mo. 214, 59 S.W. 79 (1900).
54
Walsh v. Fisher, 102 Wis. 172. 78 N.W. 437 (1899); cf. Bonwit Teller, Inc.
v. United Parcel Service of New York, (S.Ct., Spec. Term, N.Y. Co. 1942) 36
N.Y.S. (2d) 304, where picketing of plaintiff's store was held to be no excuse for
failure of defendant to pick up and deliver packages to plaintiff's customers.
55
See CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 456 (1932), and 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS,
§ 1937 (1938).
.
56
See notes 32-39, supra.
57
II3 Iowa 308, 85 N.W. 28 (1901). It would seem that the result here
reached could logically be based on the doctrine of "frustration" on the ground that
the facts involve a failure of consideration despite the possibility of literal compliance.
118
Paxton Lumber Co. v. Panth!!r Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 341, 98 S.E. 563 (1919),
which as an alternative ground for decision was rested on impracticability of performance.
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drilled to the desired depth without encountering such a formation. Gs
The "mistake" in such cases would seem to be the promisor's failure
to anticipate and guard against risks and difficulties inherent in executing his agreement, rather than the false assumption by the parties of
facts essential to the existence of their contract
An examination of the cases shows that the excuse afforded by impracticability, due to unforeseen and unreasonable "difficulty, expense,
injury, or loss," is a new and growing concept in contract law. Because
impracticability often masquerades in the better known form of impossibility, its scope and substance are as yet undetermined. Certainly
the doctrine will serve as little more than an ill-defined equitable im~
plement to relieve one of a "hard bargain" until courts develop criteria
by declaring when and how far impracticability shall be accepted as
an excuse. The prevailing practice of calling "impossible" what is
merely ''impracticable" in order to give relief for failure to perform
onerous contractual duties serves to fictionalize legal rights and confuse judicial precedent. If liability is excused because performance of
the contract has become impracticable, it would seem eminently desirable that courts frankly gauge the excuse in undisguised terms.
As a matter of jt;tdicial policy, there is danger of introducing great
uncertainty into contractual relations through the doctrine of imprac. ticability. In a practical sense most contracts are entered into as a form
of insurance by which either party attempts to cast the risk of performance upon the other. Each has generally been accorded the right
to the protection of his contract when the other has most desired to
discard it. When a promisor is beset with such unexpected hardship
and expense in carrying out his promise that he abandons performance,
the law may make him pay damages or throw the loss upon the innocent promisee.6 ° For centuries courts have followed the fc~rmer
course. It is submittecl that seldom may the law relieve hardship
through the excuse of impracticability without violating historic fundamentals in the law of contracts.
Ira M. Price, II, S.Ed.
Ga Cosden Oil and Gas Co. v. Moss, 131 Okla. 49, 267 P. 855 (1928), which
rested also on the ground that performance had become practically impossible.
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"Performance which proves to be more than twice as costly as expected may
well be considered unreasonably expensive, but promisers have been held bound by .
such promises. • • • Is the principle different when the expense can be fixed at ten
times the normal? What the promiser actually does when he finds that the increased
cost of performance will exceed the damages he will have to pay for failing to perform,
is to choose the latter course. Beyond the point where damages and increased expense
are equal, the size of such increase produces no added hardship upon the promiser,
who pays the same damages whether the cost of performance be double or a hundred
times what he expected." Parkinson, "Excuse of Performance by Existence of Condition Causing Unforeseen Expense," 4 CAL. L. Rev. 407 at 409 (1916).

